Modal Intensionalism by Warmke, Craig
MODAL INTENSIONALISM
Craig Warmke
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in








CRAIG WARMKE: Modal Intensionalism
(Under the direction of L.A. Paul.)
The traditional approach to modality analyzes necessity and possibility in terms
of possible worlds. According to this approach, what is necessarily true is true
in (or at) all possible worlds. In the first half of this paper, I argue that there is
a genuine alternative approach to modality. The alternative approach does not
appeal to possible worlds but properties that bear various relations of inclusion and
exclusion to one another. In the second half of this paper, I flesh out the formal
details of this approach with respect to the modal propositional calculi. The result
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Introduction
Contemporary discussions of necessity and possibility revolve around the Leib-
nizian view that our world is one among many possible worlds. On the standard
possible worlds approach to modality, what is possible is true in at least one pos-
sible world and what’s necessary is true in them all. Possible worlds help clarify
the meaning of our modal discourse and provide the foundation for an elegant
semantics for modal logic. And philosophers use them to formulate and evaluate
modal arguments and distinguish various philosophical positions. Possible worlds
are extremely useful.
Because of this theoretical utility, many philosophers now believe that possible
worlds are indispensible. And many who don’t believe in their indispensibility, or
even their existence, appeal to possible worlds anyway. Even those who dislike
possible worlds realize that they would have nothing to fill the gigantic holes left
by removing them from their philosophical toolkits. As a general approach to
modality, the standard possible worlds approach is simply the only game in town.
To be sure, although possible worlds have a monopoly on our modal theorizing,
no particular view of possible worlds does. Broadly speaking, three views of pos-
sible worlds have been more influential than any others. The first is David Lewis’s
modal realism.1 Lewis identifies possible worlds with spatio-temporally isolated
universes. Any way things could be is the way some concrete universe really is.
Only our world is actual, however, because ‘actual’ is an indexical like ‘here’: just
as ‘here’ refers to the place of utterance, ‘actual’ refers to the spatio-temporally iso-
lated universe of utterance. Consequently, modal realism runs afoul of actualism,
the thesis that everything is actual, because it implies that non-actual universes
1 Lewis (1986).
exist.
Secondly, there is the family of views that Lewis calls erzatz modal realism.2
According to these views, possible worlds are intimately associated with represen-
tations of ways our world might have been. Something is possible just in case
some abstract object or some collection of abstract objects represents it as being
so. And what’s necessary is what every relevant abstract object (or collection
of abstract objections) represents. These abstracta are variously identified with
consistent sets of propositions, exemplifiable properties, and obtainable states of
affairs. But whatever kind of abstracta ersatzers identify with possible worlds, we
must remember that these possible worlds are not worlds in the ordinary sense,
but world-surrogates. Therefore, and secondly, esratzers are actualists insofar as
their world-surrogates exist in our world.
Finally, there is Gideon Rosen’s fictionalism about possible worlds.3 Ac-
cording to Rosen, modal propositions are on par with propositions about fictional
characters. The proposition that Sherlock lives on Baker St. is true according to
the Sherlock Holmes stories. Similarly, the fictionalist about possible worlds says
that modal propositions are true or false according to the fiction of possible worlds.
So, for example, it is possible that there are blue swans because, according to the
fiction of possible worlds, there is a universe containing blue swans. Fictions pose
no threat to actualism. And fictionalism promises an analysis of modal notions
without the ontological costs of the previous views.
And so there are three broad views about possible worlds: modal realism, ersatz
modal realism, and fictionalism. Despite their differences, they share important
common ground. Theorists of each kind understand or analyze modal notions in
terms of possible worlds. And, furthermore, they understand or analyze necessity
as truth in (or at) all possible worlds. Each view sees possible worlds as the subject
matter of modal discourse.4 But I disagree. I believe there is a more ontologically




perspicuous account of the modal facts.
The possible worlds approach seems to mislocate the source of necessity. Sup-
pose that copper is metal necessarily. According to modal realism, copper is
necessarily metal because it happens to be metal in every universe in which it
exists. Ersatz modal realism says that copper is necessarily metal because every
world-surrogate which represents copper also represents it as a metal. Fictional-
ism says that, according to the fiction of possible worlds, copper is metal in every
world in which it exists. But this is backwards in every case. There is something
about copper itself (or about the concept of copper) which gaurantees that any
copper is metal. So prima facie, the source of necessity is not the vast expanse
of island universes or the distant realm of world-surrogates. Prima facie, without
any recourse to world-surrogates, the source of necessity is our world itself and
its constituents. Quite simply, then, fictionalism is bad fiction because it tells the
wrong story about the source of modality.
Possible worlds theorists, ersatzers in particular, may reply that world-surrogates
weren’t meant to ground the modal facts anyway. They represent those facts, and
that’s as good as anyone can do. Fair enough. But if there is an actualist, ontolog-
ically sensible alternative approach that accounts for the modal facts themselves
and makes sense of our modal judgments, we should prefer it.
There is such an alternative, or rather a family of alternatives. I discuss the
main difference between my approach and the possible worlds approach in Sec-
tions 1 and 2. Here, I’ll offer the a summary of my view. The alternative approach
does not appeal to worlds (or world-surrogates) but properties that bear various
relations of inclusion and exclusion to one another. According to my particular ap-
proach, our world has two important properties (in the loose sense of “property”).
We look around at the blooming, buzzing confusion of the actual world and infer
that there is some property, the property of being this very world. Thus, the actual
world that we live in has the property, being the actual world.5 Nothing can have
5 On my view, the property of being this world and the property of being the actual world are
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the property of being our world unless what has that property is also such that,
for example, George Washington is the first U.S. president. We might say that it’s
just part of being our world that George Washington is the first U.S. president.
On my approach, I take this “part”-talk literally, and use it in my treatment of a
proposition’s truth (or falsity). A proposition φ is true just in case the property
being such that φ is part of being the actual world.
Our world has a second property. After looking around and noting that our
world has the property of being this world, we also notice that it has the property
of being a world in general. This more general property, being a world, is an
abstraction from the property of being this world. But it, too, is a property
that our very own world has. It’s helpful to think of being the actual world as a
determinate property of the determinable being a world. Nothing can be our world
unless it’s a world at all, so we might say that part of being our world is that it’s
just a world at all. Again, I take this “part”-talk literally so that being a world is
part of being the actual world. Now whereas I treat the truth of a proposition with
respect to the property being the actual world, I treat necessary or possible truth
with respect to the property being a world. Nothing can be a world unless it’s such
that 2 + 2 = 4. So we might say that being such that 2 + 2 = 4 is just part of
being a world. Once more, I take this “part”-talk literally. The proposition that
2 +2 = 4 is necessarily true because being such that 2 + 2 = 4 is part of being a
world. And the central idea is that a proposition φ is necessarily true just in case
being such that φ is part of being a world.
Possibility is also analyzed in terms of the property being a world. On my
view, possibility is defined in terms of necessity so that a proposition φ is possible
just in case not-φ isn’t necessary. That is, a proposition φ is possible just in case
the property being such that not-φ is no part of being a world. That’s all—no
island universes, no world-surrogates. The approach depends merely on two of
identical. And the property of being an actual world is distinct from both. This latter property
is just the property of being a world at all—so the property of being a world at all is necessarily
uniquely instantiated.
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our world’s actual properties.
But why should necessary or possible truth have anything to do with the
property being a world? The answer to this question depends on our conception
of worldhood. I explicate different conceptions of worldhood later in Section 3. But
I will make the point now with my favored conception of worldhood. According to
my favored conception, something is a world just in case it comprises everything
that exists. So there is a world just in case there is a totality of everything that
exists. Therefore, if being such that φ is part of being a world, then it’s also
just part of the property being a totality of everything that exists. Furthermore,
anything that has a property, must also have all the properties that are parts of
that property.6 So nothing can have the property of being a totality of everything
that exists without also being such that φ. But there is no totality of everything
that exists unless something exists. Thus, if something exists, then something
has the property being a world, and if something has the property being a world,
then something has all the properties that are parts of being a world. Nothing can
exist, then, unless φ is true. So if being such that φ is part of being a world, φ is
necessarily true. If one holds the totality conception of worldhood, then there is
a clear link between necessity and being part of being a world.
Notice that since being a world is part of being the actual world, if being such
that φ is part of the former, it’s a part of the latter, too, by the transitivity of
parthood. So if φ is necessarily true because being such that φ is part of being a
world, then φ is true because being such that φ is a part of being the actual world,
by the transitivity of parthood. Thus, we have already secured the validity of the
axiom that what is necessarily true is actually true. Surprisingly, this approach
is flexible enough to secure other well-known axioms of modal logic. In fact, it’s
flexible enough to provide a semantics for the normal modal propositional calculi.
I show as much in Sections 5 through 7.
My approach is also more sensible metaphysically. Our world has the property
6 I develop a property mereology in Section 4.
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being a world, the actually existing property that grounds necessity and possibility.
So we need look no further than our own world for an account of modality. In
this regard, it has an advantage over Lewis’s modal realism. And, moreover, this
approach guarantees that the intrinsic character of our own world grounds the
modal facts. On this point, it has an advantage over other versions of ersatz modal
realism. So if one has the fictionalist itch, my approach provides the resources for
better fiction.
So I want to discuss this alternative approach in more detail. Along the way,
I will provide a new and completely un-Kripkean formal semantics to the modal
proposition calculi.
Inclusion
The most basic point of disagreement between the possible worlds approach
and my own concerns the relation between the actual world and modal space.
These approaches disagree about how best to understand the singular affirmative
statement that the actual world is a world. To draw out the substance of this
disagreement, I shall take a brief detour through two kinds of inclusion relation
one may use to treat the truth of singular affirmative sentences.
To begin, consider the sentence ‘Fred is tall’. On the standard and most
familiar treatments, this sentence is true just in case Fred is in the extension of
‘tall’, the class or set of things which are tall. But these standard treatments make
a substantive philosophical assumption. They assume that the truth of a subject-
predicate sentence consists in the predicate’s extension including the subject’s
referent. Let’s call this kind of inclusion relation where the predicate’s extension
includes the subject’s referent, extensional inclusion.7 And call the approach to
logic which treats the truth (or falsity) of a sentence as depending on extensional
inclusion relations, logical extensionalism.
7 I borrow the terms “extensional inclusion” and “intensional inclusion” from Swoyer (1995).
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There is an alternative to logical extensionalism. The alternative treatment
depends partly on the notion of an intensional entity. Intensional entities are
associated with extensions in the actual world just as extensional entities are.
But whereas the extensions associated with extensional entities are sufficient to
distinguish them, the extensions associated with intensional entities are not.8 Sets
and classes are extensional entities because no two sets or classes have the same
actual members. For example, the class of renates is identical to the class of
cordates because they have the same actual members. In contrast, non-identical
intensional entities may apply to the very same actual individuals. For instance,
being a renate and being a cordate are distinct properties even though the same
actual individuals have them. Similarly, two concepts may apply to the same actual
individuals without being identical. Both concepts and properties are intensional
in this sense.
Terms like ‘Fred’ and ‘the Eiffel Tower’ have associated intensional entities, like
the property being Fred or the concept being the Eiffel Tower. A term’s associated
intensional entities are its intensions, and a term may have both fine-grained
and course-grained intensions.9 The fine-grained intension of ‘water’ is distinct
from the fine-grained intension of ‘H20’ even though the course-grained intensions
of ‘water’ and ‘H20’ are identical. Usually, fine-grained intensions are identified
with concepts and course-grained intensions with properties. I shall make two
assumptions. First, I will identify the course-grained intensions of terms with
properties (in the loose sense of “property”). Thus, the course-grained intension
(hereafter, just “intension”) of ‘Fred’ is the property being Fred. And I shall assume
that predicates express properties. The predicate ‘is tall’ expresses the property
being tall. As a result, a predicate term expresses an entity of the same ontological
category as a subject term’s intension.




‘Fred is tall’. The alternative does not treat the truth of sentences as depending
on extensional inclusion relations. Instead, it treats a sentence’s truth (or falsity)
as depending on whether the subject’s intension includes the property that the
predicate expresses. Call this kind of relation intensional inclusion. And call the
approach to logic which treats the truth (or falsity) of a sentence as depending
on intensional inclusion relations, logical intensionalism. On this approach, the
sentence ‘Fred is tall’ is true just in case the property being Fred includes the
property being tall. There is a tradition of identifying properties with sets of
individuals, whether actual or possible, but this is not obviously compatible with
logical intensionalism. The most natural way to develop logical intensionalism is
to let properties stand as sui generis entities in their own right.
The crucial difference between logical extensionalism and logical intensionalism
isn’t so much the kinds of entities that do or don’t include one another. Rather,
the crucial difference is the direction of inclusion in the treatment of a sentence’s
truth (or falsity).10 The figures below depict this difference (where T and F are
the properties being tall and being Fred, respectively):
We’re now in a position to state the alternative treatment of sentences
like ‘Fred is tall’. The alternative does not treat the truth of sentences
as depending on extensional inclusion relations. I stead, it t e ts a sen-
tence’s truth (or falsity) as depending on whether the subject’s intension
includes the property that the predicate expresses. Call this kind of re-
lation intensional inclusion. And call the approach to logic which treats
the truth (or falsity) of a sentence as depending on intensional inclusion
relations, logic l intensionalism. On this approach, the sentence ‘Fred is
tall’ is true just in case the property being Fred includes the property
being tall. There is a tradition of identifying properties with sets of indi-
viduals, whether actual or possible, but this is not obviously compatible
with logical intensionalism. The most natural way to develop logical in-
tensionalism is to let properties stand as sui generis entities in their own
right.
The crucial diﬀerence between logical extensi alism and logical in-
tensionalism isn’t so much the kinds of entities that do or don’t include
one another. Rather, the crucial diﬀerence is the direction of inclusion
in the treatment of a sentence’s truth (or falsity).10 The figures below
depict this diﬀerence (where T and F are the properties being tall and
being Fred, respectively):
FT ‘Tall’ : { }Fred
Whereas the set of tall things includes Fred on the extensionalist ap-
proach, being Fred includes being tall on the intensionalist approach.
Leibniz famously took an intensionalist approach to logic.11 And these
10I owe this point to Christian Loew.
11Leibniz’s conceptual containment theory says that in a true sentence, the concept
of the subject includes the concept of the predicate. But I believe Leibniz’s view does
not work unless his “concepts” are course-grained intensional entities. See C53 in
Couturat (1903) and P20 in Parkinson (1966). See especially Robert Adams (1994,
Ch. 2).
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Fig. 1: Logical intensionalism (left) and logical extensionalism (right)
Whereas the set of tall things includes Fred on the extensionalist approach, being
Fred includes being tall on the intensionalist approach. Leibniz famously took an
intensionalist approach to logic.11 And these diagrams together provide some
10 I owe this point to Christian Loew.
11 Leibniz’s conceptual containment theory says that in a true sentence, the concept of the
subject includes the concept of the predicate. But I believe Leibniz’s view does not work unless
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justification for Leibniz’s claim that one approach is the inversion of the other.12
In the next section, I explain why the prevalent semantics for modal logic,
possible worlds semantics, constitutes an extensionalist approach to modality. And
then I show that there is a genuine alternative.
Two Approaches to Modality
When one offers a semantics for a modal logic, one may mean to accomplish
one of two tasks. Minimally, one supplies what Alvin Plantinga (1976: 127) aptly
calls a pure semantics. A pure semantics for modal logic defines ‘is a valid formula’
for the various modal systems and tells us when formulas with modal operators
are valid in a system. A pure semantics need not have any connection at all to
the ordinary modal notions of necessity and possibility, though.
So in addition, one may offer an applied semantics for modal logic.13 An ap-
plied semantics interprets the  as “necessarily” and the ♦ as “possibly” and, as a
result, allows us to model our modal discourse. In some sense, an applied seman-
tics for a modal logic tells us what sentences with the modal operators ‘necessarily’
and ‘possibly’ mean. At the very least, this includes detailing the conditions under
which these sentences are true. For the last half-century, Kripke semantics has
been the dominant pure semantics for modal logics.14 Possible worlds semantics,
the dominant applied semantics for modal logics, is a straightfoward application
of Kripke semantics to our modal discourse.
Possible worlds semantics constitutes an extensionalist approach to modal
logic. To make this point, we must look at its formal machinery. In possible
worlds semantics, the modal operators function implicitly like quantifiers over a
his “concepts” are course-grained intensional entities. See C53 in Couturat (1903) and P20 in
Parkinson (1966). See especially Robert Adams (1994, Ch. 2).
12 See C53 in Couturat (1903) and P20 in Parkinson (1966).
13 Plantinga (1976):127-128.
14 Kripke (1959, 1963, 1965).
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domain of possible worlds. For instance, (let ‘’ be the necessity operator and ‘♦’
the possibility operator, as usual), ‘P’ is read ‘necessarily, P’, and is true just in
case ‘P’ is true in every (accessible) possible world. So what is necessarily true is
true in every (accessible) possible world. And, similarly, we formalize ‘possibly, P’
as ‘♦P’, which is true just in case ‘P’ is true in some (accessible) possible world.
What is possibly true is true in at least one (accessible) possible world.
In Kripke (1963), a model structure or a frame consists of an ordered triple 〈G,
K, R〉, where K is a non-empty set of possible worlds and G, the actual world, is
a member of K.15 R is the accessibility relation between worlds represented by a
binary relation on K. A model is an ordered quadruple 〈G, K, R, V〉, where V is a
valuation function that assigns a truth value to each proposition in every possible
world in K. Let’s suppose that in some model M, K = {w1, w2, w3}, G = w1, and
R = {〈w1, w2〉, 〈w2,w3〉}. As long as V assigns ‘truth’ (or ‘1’) to P in every world
in K that is accessible to G, ‘P’ is true. This is the formal machinery behind the
claim that what is necessarily true is true in all (accessible) possible worlds.
At the very center of this machinery is a striking assumption. Consider the
statement ‘the actual possible world is a possible world’. If, as good logical ex-
tensionalists, we were to construct a model to evaluate this sentence in standard
predicate logic, we would assign a class of possible worlds to our domain of dis-
course. Furthermore, the referent of ‘the actual possible world’ is, depending on
one’s view of possible worlds, either our very world or some world-surrogate that
correctly represents our world. And, presumably, the extension of ‘is a possible
world’ contains, again depending on one’s view of worlds, all the island universes,
ours included, or all the world-surrogates. Extensionally interpreted, the sentence
‘the actual possible world is a possible world’ is true because the actual possi-
ble world is a member of the class of possible worlds. Notice that the frames in
15 G is often left out in more recent presentations. This doesn’t matter much for my purposes.
For even if the actual world isn’t specified as such in the frame, one must still pick out a world
in K as special in order to say what is actually true, and not just true according to some world
or other.
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possible worlds semantics “encode” this sort of treatment. In a frame, there is a
set of possible worlds, K, one of which is actual—G. The structure built into the
frame “encodes” the structure underlying the model a logical extensionalist would
provide for the sentence ‘the actual possible world is a possible world’. Thus, I call
the semantic approach to modality according to which the actual possible world
is a member of the class of possible worlds modal extensionalism. Possible worlds
semantics constitutes an extensionalist semantic approach to modal logic.
On the alternative approach, the sentence we evaluate is not ‘the actual possi-
ble world is a possible world’ but ‘the actual world is a world’. On my approach,
the actual world is this world. And there is only one world—one totality of ev-
erything that exists. Intuitively, this is the most natural way to understand the
sentence ‘the actual world is a world’. The modal extensionalist cannot “encode”
this understanding of ‘the actual world is a world’ in her semantics unless she is
prepared to say that our world is the only possible world. For in her extensional
treatment of modality, if there is only one possible world, then strong necessitar-
ianism follows. So already we should see that modal extensionalism “encodes”
a slightly unintuitive understanding of the relationship between the actual world
and modal space.
According to the logical intensionalist, the treatment of a statement’s truth-
value depends on the intensional inclusion relation between the subject term’s
intension and the property the predicate term expresses. Thus, the logical inten-
sionalist says that ‘the actual world is a world’ is true just in case the property
being the actual world includes another, being a world. Accordingly, a semantics
for modal logic may “encode” this intensionalist treatment. Modal intensionalism
is the semantic approach to modality according to which being the actual world
includes being a world. This is more a caricature than a definition. And this
paper’s purpose is to explain that caricature.
One can see the differences between modal intensionalism and modal exten-
sionalism in their respective frames. In Kripke’s ordered triple, 〈G, K, R〉, R is an
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accessibility relation on the set of worlds K and the actual world G, is a member
of K. Modal intensionalism replaces Kripke’s triple with another. In my own pre-
sentation of modal intensionalism, the property (again, in the loose sense) being a
world is part of the property being the actual world. Let A be the property being
the actual world,W be the property being a world, and P be the parthood relation
on properties. Together, these three comprise the modal intensionalist’s ordered
triple: 〈A, W , P〉. At the core of the semantics, W is a part of A, an inversion of
the modal extensionalist’s core where the actual world is a member of the set of
worlds. This intensional inversion is apparent in the diagrams below:
AW K: { }w1 w2 w3
G
... wn
The modal extensionalist’s picture is the modal intensionalist’s pic-
ture turned “inside out.” And, conversely, the modal intensionalist’s
picture is the modal extensionalist’s picture turned “outside in.” They
appear to be diﬀerent sides of the same modal coin. This is one reason to
be suspicious about rejecting one approach in toto in favor of the other.
And, furthermore, this is one reason to be suspicious about the monopoly
possible worlds semantics currently has on our modal theorizing.
But, you ask, why bother with another semantics given the success
and elegance of Kripke semantics and possible world semantics? I have
no objection to Kripke semantics as a purely formal enterprise. And I
have no intention of supplanting it with the formal machinery I develop
below. But surely there’s nothing wrong with having options, especially
purely formal ones. So I see no harm in adding mine to the mix.
Possible worlds semantics is obviously an elegant tool for modeling
our modal discourse. Philosophers have used possible worlds semantics
to shed light on a number of age-old philosophical problems. Partly due
to this success, philosophers began to analyze modal notions in terms
of possible worlds. Countless metaphysical debates about the nature
of possible worlds followed. But as I mentioned in Section I, possible
worlds—whatever they are—don’t have much at all to do with modality
on a fundamental level, either metaphysically or epistemologically. Even
so, I think that possible worlds semantics is a sometimes-useful heuristic.
And, what’s more, I do think ersatz world-surrogates exist. I just don’t
buy into the possible worlds framework as a general approach to modal-
ity. Each approach has its merits. The modal intensionalist approach
just serves some purposes better.16
16Of course, I can’t justifiably claim that modal intensionalism is better suited for
any purpose without an intensionalist approach to quantified modal logic.
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Fig. 2: Modal intensionalism (left) and modal extensionalism (right)
The modal extensionalist’s picture is the modal intensionalist’s picture turned
“inside ut.” And, conversely, the modal intension ist’s picture is the modal
extensio alist’s picture turned “outside in.” They appear to be different sides of
the same modal coin. This is one reason to be suspicious about rejecting one
approach in toto in favor of the other. And, furthermore, this is one reason to
be suspicious about the monopoly possible worlds semantics currently has on our
modal theorizing.
But, you ask, why bother with another semantics given the success and elegance
of Kripke semantics and possible world semantics? I have no objection to Kripke
semantics as a purely formal enterprise. And I have no int ntion of supplanting
it with the formal machinery I develop below. But surely there’s nothing wrong
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with having options, especially purely formal ones. So I see no harm in adding
mine to the mix.
Possible worlds semantics is obviously an elegant tool for modeling our modal
discourse. Philosophers have used possible worlds semantics to shed light on a
number of age-old philosophical problems. Partly due to this success, philosophers
began to analyze modal notions in terms of possible worlds. Countless metaphys-
ical debates about the nature of possible worlds followed. But as I mentioned in
Section I, possible worlds—whatever they are—don’t have much at all to do with
modality on a fundamental level. Even so, I think that possible worlds semantics is
a sometimes-useful heuristic. And, what’s more, I do think ersatz world-surrogates
exist. I just don’t buy into the possible worlds framework as a general approach to
modality. Each approach has its merits. The modal intensionalist approach just
serves some purposes better.16
Modality’s reach is quite impressive, stretching from metaphysics and episte-
mology to ethics and the philosophy of language. A new approach to modality
provides opportunities to evaluate old debates in a new light. Though a new ap-
proach may bring new problems, it may dissolve others. At any rate, the success
of possible worlds semantics doesn’t justify its current monopoly on our modal
theorizing.
In what follows, I outline an intensionalist approach to modal propositional
logic, including the requisite machinery for an alternative to Kripke semantics.
In the next two sections I explain two especially basic commitments of modal
intensionalism. I’ve claimed that there are such properties as being a world and
being the actual world. In the next section, I’ll explain what this claim means for
the modal intensionalist. I’ve also claimed that these two properties bear a special
parthood relation to one another. In the subsequent section, I’ll propose some
axioms that may reasonably characterize this relation.
16 Of course, I can’t justifiably claim that modal intensionalism is better suited for any purpose
without an intensionalist approach to quantified modal logic.
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On Being a World
Despite the widespread acceptance of possible worlds, some have doubted the
very coherence of the concept of a world. Kant, for example understands the
world as the sum total of all appearances, i.e., as the sum total of all objects and
events in space and time (A420/B448).17 If there were such a world, it would
transcend all possible experience. Kant claims the four antinomies show that
transcendental realists’ mistakenly believe that there is such a thing. Some have
expressed similar Kantian doubts. Bas van Fraassen (1995) argues that ‘world’ is
not a count-noun and that there is no thing which corresponds to ‘the world’.18
A related worry concerns the status of absolutely unrestricted quantification. If
a world is a collection of everything that exists, then one might question whether
there could be such a thing or whether we could even refer to it.19 I shall
assume that these worries are answerable, in principle. In any case, both modal
extensionalism and modal intensionalism crucially depend on the idea that there is
a world. Neither approach carries the special burden of discharging these worries.
Modal extensionalists agree that there is at least one world. Of course, many
modal extensionalists associate possible worlds with various sorts of abstracta.
But these abstracta aren’t worlds in the same sense that our world is a world.20
Even these modal extensionalists agree that we live in a world. However, modal
extensionalists disagree with one another about what it takes to be a world. There
are two broad camps: those who think that everything in a world must be spatio-
temporally interrelated and those who think that everything in a world must
comprise everything that exists. Let’s call the first view of worldhood the interre-
17 He also recognizes a transcendental sense of “world” according to which the world is the
“absolute totality of the sum total of existing things” (A420/B448).
18 Others lodge Cantorian arguments against modal extensionalists who associate possible
worlds with collections of maximally consistent sets of propositions. See, most recently, Ju-
bien (2009).
19 See the essays in Rayo and Uzquiano (2007).
20 See Lycan (1990: 215) and Lewis (1986:140).
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latedness conception21 and the second view the totality conception.
Modal extensionalists also agree that only one world is actual. But they dis-
agree with one another about what this means. And, again, there are roughly two
camps. Some say that ‘actual’ is an indexical like ‘here’. Just as ‘here’ refers to the
place of utterance, ‘the actual world’ refers to the world of utterance. Others say
that everything there is (or exists) is actual. I’ll call the first view of actuality the
indexical conception and the second view, the reality conception. The indexical
conception of actuality can be paired unproblematically with either the interrelat-
edness or totality conceptions of worldhood.22 But one cannot straightforwardly
pair the reality conception of actuality with the interrelatedness conception. If
everything is actual, even worlds spatio-temporally disconnected from ours, then
each of these is actual and none merely possible. This pairing undercuts the appeal
to worlds to make sense of mere possibility.
Though I favor the totality conception of worldhood, modal intensionalism is
officially mum with respect to whether a world must be an interrelated whole or a
complete totality. It’s also officially mum about whether ‘is actual’ is an indexical
or whether it’s synonymous with ‘is real’ or ‘exists’. However, I will assume that
one combination of views is unavailable, no matter which approach to modality one
takes: the interrelatedness conception of worldhood with the reality conception of
actuality.
Thus far, I have characterized modal intensionalism as a view that appeals
to two properties: being the actual world and being a world. To facilitate the
discussion, I shall continue to assume that these are properties in the loose sense of
“property.” This is only fair: modal extensionalists appeal to possible worlds, but
possible worlds might be spatio-temporally isolated universes, sets of propositions,
states of affairs, structural universals, fictions, etc. There is also a wide range
of metaphysical options for the modal intensionalist: these properties might be
21 The most recent defender is David Lewis (1986).
22 Lewis (1986) and Stalnaker (1976), respectively.
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predicates, concepts, states of affairs, universals, or something else. I require a
term that is neutral between these options to delineate the broad commitments
of modal intensionalism. And “property” is just as good as any. So for now,
I shall call whatever those entities are that play a special role in my semantics
“properties.”
The distinction between the abundant conception and the sparse conception
of properties is fairly well understood.23 Roughly, sparse properties are those that
make for qualitative similarity between intrinsic duplicates, like charge and mass.
On the abundant conception of properties, there is a property for any of a wide
range of English predicates—‘is tall or ugly’ expresses the property being tall or
ugly and ‘is five miles from Cleveland’ expresses the property being five miles
from Cleveland. The abundant conception of properties permits disjunctive and
extrinsic properties like these, as well as two properties I’ve alluded to thus far:
being the actual world and being a world. I shall proceed as if there is an abundant
realm of properties, whether those properties end up being universals, concepts,
or whatever. And I shall proceed as if being the actual world and being a world
both populate the realm of abundant properties. This association is apt because
it preserves the required metaphysical neutrality: one may identify properties on
the abundant conception with some other kind of entity.24
But we can do more than just proceed “as if” these properties exist as long
as we’re willing to set aside the Kantian worries noted above. Given an actual
world, why not think there is a property being the actual world in the loose sense
of “property”? This is no more problematic than saying that a baseball has the
property being a baseball, if the world is an interrelated whole, or that some atoms
arranged baseball-wise have the property being some atoms arranged baseballwise,
if the world isn’t so much an interrelated whole but a multiplicity of things that
23 See Lewis (1983) and Lewis (1986, 59-69).
24 Lewis (1986, 60) identifies properties on the abundant conception with sets. Bealer (1982)
identifies them with concepts. On the intensional approach, sets probably cannot be abundant
properties. But, of course, there are other possible candidates.
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jointly have some feature. There is a property, being the actual world, and the
actual world has it.
The property being the actual world is the property of being this world. Here,
I’m using ‘the actual world’ as a name which refers to our world. So the property
of being the actual world is importantly different from the property being an
actual world. The property being an actual world is merely the property of being
a world—nothing can be a world unless it’s an actual one. Something could
have the property being an actual world and also be such that George Washington
never existed. But the property being the actual world brings George Washington’s
existence along with it because our world is such that George Washington exists.
Furthermore, the properties being the actual world and being a world are not
identical. Nothing can have the former property unless it’s such that George
Washington exists, fights in the Revolutionary War, marries Martha, etc. Nothing
could have the property being the actual world, unless that something is our world.
But things could have gone differently. George might have never been born, for
example. George is important, but not so important that nothing could have the
property of being a world unless it’s such that George exists. That George exists
and fights in the War is part of being the actual world. But that he exists and
fights in the War isn’t part of being a world. So there is something true of being
the actual world that’s not true of being a world.
These two properties relate to one another as determinate to determinable,
just as crimson is a determinate of the determinable red. Determinates of a given
determinable vary with respect to what Eric Funkhouser (2006: 551) calls de-
termination dimensions. Once you’ve set a specific value for every determination
dimension of a given determinable, you’ve competely specified a determinate prop-
erty. The determination dimensions for color, for example, are hue, brightness,
and saturation—once you’ve set a value for each of them, you’ve specified a de-
terminate color property. To have a determinate color property is to have the
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determinable property it falls under in a specific way.25 Similarly, being a world
in which this or that happens is to be a world in a certain way. So being our
world is being a world in a specific way—so specific that being the actual world
cannot be a determinable relative to a further set of determinates. It is already
maximally specified.
In addition, a determinable’s determinates must share certain features. Funkhouser
(2006: 551) calls these non-determinable necessities. Triangles may differ in side-
length—that is one determination dimension—but triangles must be three-sided.
Similarly, George Washington might not have existed, but a world must be an
interrelated whole or complete totality, depending on one’s conception of world-
hood. Thus, the property being the actual world behaves like a determinate of the
property being a world.
Importantly, of the two properties, being the actual world has epistemological
priority. We look around at the blooming, buzzing confusion of the actual world
and infer that there is some property, the property of being this world. The more
general property being a world is an abstraction from the property of being this
world. In some sense, the property being a world has lost a great deal of informa-
tion encoded in the property of being this world. What’s left are the individually
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for worldhood in general. Given these
differences, I conclude that the property of being a world isn’t identical to the
property of being our world—not unless some strong form of necessitarianism is
true.
On Parts of Properties
Officially, modal intensionalism takes no stand on the sort of intensional in-
clusion relation that holds between being the actual world and being a world.26
25 Funkhouser (2006: 548).
26 Leibniz held a containment view of intensional inclusion, Spinoza an involvement view, and
Jubien, most recently, an entailment view. But, importantly, I think Jubien’s entailment relation
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But I do—being a world is part of being the actual world. In this section, I pro-
vide some intuitive support for this claim and propose some axioms that plausibly
characterize this mereological relation.
The word ‘part’ has many different uses in English. In a familiar sense of ‘part’,
desks and lamps have parts, as do cups and books. Or at least we’re inclined to
talk among the folk as if they do. The claim that being a world is part of being
the actual world lies at the heart of my intensional approach to modality. And
this claim contains a common but less familiar sense of ‘part’.27 Lazy schoolboys
and schoolgirls are quite familiar with this sense. The student complains about
practicing the piano, and the parent quickly responds that practicing is “just part
of being a good pianist.” This usage of ‘part’ is ubiquitous.28 We say that
being honest is a part of being moral, that being rational is part of being human,
and that “being rectangular is only part of being square.”29 These are perfectly
meaningful uses of the word ‘part’. In this section, I provide an intuitive set of
definitions and some possible axioms for the kind of relation or relations that hold
between these properties.
In the realm of abundant properties, parts of properties are other properties.
Not all abundant properties are purely qualitative and so the parthood relation is
not something like “qualitative” parthood. Having a particular location in space
or time is a property. Being identical to some particular thing is a property, too.
Thus, the parts of properties need not be purely qualitative parts. They might also
be logical, devoid of qualitative content. So I’ll borrow L.A. Paul’s (2002) term
is not a species of intensional inclusion, but just intensional inclusion.
27 This usage is briefly mentioned in Varzi (2009).
28 Here are just a few examples: In a June 2009 New York Times article, Barack Obama
says that “Part of being a good friend is being honest.” Found here: http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/06/02/world/middleeast/02prexy.html? r=1. Tony Dungy says that “Part of being a
leader at the quarterback position is protecting the football. Found here: http://espn.go.com/
blog/dallas/cowboys/post/ /id/4673175/tony-romo-invites-tony-dungy-to-valley-ranch. In the
philosophical literature, I must also mention John Searle’s (1995, 34) famous examples: “Part
of being a cocktail party is being thought to be a cocktail party; part of being a war is being
thought to be a war.” And Michael Jubien (1996: 119) claims that “being coloured is part of
being red.”
29 Maurer and Ralston (2004: 59).
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‘logical parthood’ for this relation, and I’ll call parts of properties logical parts.
The definitions and axioms for logical parthood below differ from Paul’s for at
least one simple reason: I’m interested in the mereological relationships between
abundant properties while she’s interested in limning the mereological structure of
objects under the umbrella of bundle theory. She argues that objects are fusions
of properties; I merely claim that (abundant) properties are sums of properties.
Obviously, then, we shouldn’t expect the axioms for Paul’s conception of logical
parthood to match the ones below.
The axioms of Classical Extensional Mereology and plausible axioms for logical
parthood don’t completely overlap. Below, I’ll explain where they diverge and how
the axioms for logical parthod outstrip those of Classical Extensional Mereology.
To simplify the discussion, I will frequently drop the ‘logical’ in ‘logical parthood’,
‘logical part’, etc. The variables here range over properties. Let ‘’ represent the
chosen primitive, ‘is (a) proper part of’. With this primitive we define parthood,
overlap, disjointness, and a general sum operator (and I adopt the convention of
striking through an operator instead of placing a negation sign with wide-scope
over that operator):30
(D1) x < y ≡ x  y ∨ x = y
(D2) x ◦ y ≡ ∃z(z < x ∧ z < y)
(D3) xoy ≡ x 6 ◦ y
(D4) σx(x < y) = ιz∀w(w◦z ≡ ∃m(m < y ∧ w ◦ m))
(The first definition (D1) says that one property is part of some property just
in case the first is a proper part of that property or identical with it. (D2) says
that two properties overlap iff some property is a part of both. The third defintion
(D3) says that two properties are disjoint just in case they don’t overlap. And
30 I won’t distinguish between being part of something and being a part of something. See
Casati and Varzi (1999, 32-33).
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according to (D4), the logical sum of the properties that are parts of y is the
property such that anything overlaps just in case it overlaps y.)
Two axioms straightforwardly carry over from Classical Extensional Mereology
to the property mereology:
(A1) x  y ⊃ y 6 x
(A2) x  y ∧ y  z ⊃ x  z
Axioms (A1) and (A2) imply that proper parthood is asymmetric and transitive,
respectively. Logical parthood respects these axioms and definitions. Consider
three properties, being rational, being mammalian, and being human. Suppose the
properties being rational and being mammalian are parts—logical parts—of being
human.31 The property being human isn’t part of being rational. Presumably,
there could be rational non-humans. So proper logical parthood seems asymmet-
ric. It also seems transitive: being a vertebrate is a proper logical part of being
mammalian, which is a proper logical part of being human. By transitivity, then,
we should expect that being a vertebrate is part of being human. And it is. The
axioms (A1) and (A2) seem to adequately characterize logical parthood.
But two other axioms of Classical Extensional Mereology don’t straightfor-
wardly carry over. The two principles below are the property mereology coun-
terparts of the weak supplementation principle and the general sum principle,
respectively:
(A3) x  y ⊃ ∃z(z  y ∧ zox)
(A4) ∃x(x <w) ⊃ ∃x∀y(y◦x ≡ ∃z(z < w ∧ z ◦ y))
31 Compare Aquinas (Ch. 2, 9): “If in a sense we may say that man is composed of animal and
rational, it will not be as a third reality is made up of two other realities, but as a third concept
is formed from two other concepts.” He (Ch. 2, 11) goes on to say that “the concept of humanity
includes only that which makes man to be man.” Along similar lines, in the Port-Royale Logic (I,
ch. 6), Arnauld and Nicole distinguish between the comprehension and the extension of an idea:
“I call the comprehension of an idea the attributes that it contains in itself, and that cannot be
removed without destroying the idea.”
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The principle (A3) says that any proper part of a property doesn’t overlap
some other proper part of that property. It’s not obvious that this principle holds
for properties. In fact, I think it fails universally. Pick any two properties, being
φ and being ψ. It’s part of being each property that it is that property or the
other. Thus, being φ or ψ is a part of both. So every pair of properties overlap.
So no property has two disjoint parts. If this is correct, then (A3) doesn’t hold for
logical parthood. What does hold is a related, though slightly weaker principle,
what Varzi (2009) calls “strong company”:
(A3*) x  y ⊃ ∃z(z  y ∧ z 6< x)
This princple says that anything with a proper part has at least two and that
neither is a part of the other. Intuitively, this does hold for properties. Consider
again the properties being rational, being mammalian, and being human. The first
two properties are proper parts of being human. But all three overlap: they all have
the property being a property as a part. So they overlap, but (A3*) allows this.
Logical parthood doesn’t obey the weak supplementation principle, but that’s not
a reason to think that properties have no mereological structure. They do, and
(A3*) better chacterizes that structure.32
Does (A4), the analogue of the general sum principle, hold for logical parthood?
That is, is there a logical sum for any collection of properties? There is a reasonable
worry about unrestricted composition. Call two properties inconsistent just in
case one property has a part that precludes some part of the second property. The
property being F has a part, itself, that precludes a part of the property being
not-F, namely itself. So they are inconsistent properties. The worry is that (A4)
guarantees the existence of inconsistent properties, like being F and not-F. This
worry is easily assuaged. We may define a predicate ‘is consistent’ that applies to
all and only the sums that have no pairs of properties that preclude one another.33
32 The weak supplementation principle is disputed for spatio-temporal mereology anyway. For
example, Kathrin Koslicki (2007) argues that Fine (1999) rejects the principle. Donald Smith
(2009) also rejects it.
33 This predicate restricts the number of legitimate sums in the same way as the predicate “is
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Consistent sums are the only sums of properties that are themselves bona fide
properties. But inconsistent sums are sums of properties nonetheless.
Now there are a number of further principles one may adopt for logical part-
hood. On the intuitive conception of logical parthood, being an animal is part
of being a dog. But is it part of being a dog that being an animal is one of its
parts? Or more generally, if a property p has another property q as a part, does p
therefore have another part, being such that it has q as a part? Or more formally,
we might wonder whether logical parthood obeys the following principle (where
‘[x < y]’ signifies the property being such that x is a part of y):
(P5) x < y ⊃ [x < y] < y,
We shall call any parthood relation that satisfies (P5) ininclusive and the con-
dition itself ininclusivity. There is, I think, some intuitive pull behind ininclusivity.
We may judge that one property is a part of another because nothing could have
the latter without having the former. There can be no dog unless there is an
animal, so we may judge that being an animal is part of being a dog. But could
the property being a dog be the very property it is without having being an animal
as one of its parts? Of course not. So we may judge that being an animal ’s being
a part of being a dog is itself part of being a dog. If logical parthood is ininclusive,
then a property has an infinite number of parts if it has any parts. The iterations
soon become too unwieldy for natural language. For this reason, the formalism in
(P5) is useful: if ‘being an animal < being a dog ’ is true, then so too is ‘[being an
animal < being a dog ] < being a dog ’. And if being an animal ’s being part of being
a dog is itself part of being a dog, then by (P5), being a dog has another part: the
property, [[[being an animal < being a dog ] < being a dog ] < being a dog ]. And so
on.
There is an additional principle one may adopt for logical parthood:
(P6) x < z ∧ y < z ⊃ [¬x ≮ y] < y
with” does in Goodman (1951, 156).
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Call (P6) the fortified parts principle and any parthood relation that satisfies (P6)
fortified. The fortified parts principle is a bit difficult to state in ordinary language,
but I think it’s an intuitive principle for logical parthood. The idea is that if z
has two parts, x and y, then something else holds even if x and y have no parts
that preclude each other. It’s also built into y in a special way that its parts are
consistent. Again, let’s consider the property being a dog. Intuitively, being an
animal and being a mammal are two of its parts. So according to (P6), being a
dog has two further parts. First, part of being a dog is that being not-an-animal
isn’t a part of being a mammal. And, secondly, part of being a dog is that being
not-a-mammal isn’t part of being an animal. If (P6) holds for logical parthood,
then for every pair of some property’s parts, there are two further parts. This
principle, too, implies that anything with a part has an infinite number of parts.
Ininclusivity, (P5), says that if a property has a part, it’s a part of that property
that is has that part. Another related principle seems to hold for logical parthood:
(P7) x ≮ y ⊃ [x ≮ y] < y
That is, if x isn’t part of a property, it’s a part of that property that x isn’t a part
of it. I call this condition inexclusivity and any parthood relation that satisfies
it inexclusive. Ininclusivity tells us that if something has parts, it has parts that
detail what parts it has. Inexclusivity does something slightly different: it says
that if something doesn’t have some properties for parts, it has parts that detail
what parts it doesn’t have. As long as something’s not being a part of a property
is always a proper part of that property, (P7) implies that there are no simple or
atomic properties. Either a property has every other property as a proper part
or it doesn’t. If it does, then it has proper parts. If it doesn’t, then there is
some property that it doesn’t have as a proper part. But, then, according to (P7),
it does have another proper part, the property that it doesn’t have that other
property as a part.
This exhuasts my perfunctory treatment of logical parthood. As I’ll argue
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in Section 6, each of these plausible axioms for logical parthood is a possible
restriction one may place on P (the parthood relation in my ordered triple). And
each possible restriction on P secures the key modal axiom of some modal system.
I’ll show as much in Section 6.
Modal intensionalism depends crucially on two claims. First, that there are
properties like being a world and being the actual world. And, secondly, that
properties have other properties as parts. These claims are reasonable given the
theoretical backdrop provided in these last two sections. In the next section, I
unveil the gears that make modal intensionalism go.
Modality with One World
We live in a world, the actual world. From this we can infer that there is a
property being the actual world. And then we can abstract from this property and
infer that there is another less specific property being a world. Intuitively, being a
world is a determinable of the determinate property being the actual world. But
notice that if there is a property such as being a world then anything which has
it has to be a certain way. For instance, if one holds the totality conception of
worldhood, whatever has the property has to be a totality of everything that exists.
Or if one holds the interrelatedness conception of worldhood, whatever has it has
to be such that its spatio-temporal parts are related in a special way.
And that’s not all. Certain preconditions must be met in order for there to be
a world at all. The truths of arithmetic must hold, for example. Anything that
has the property being a world also must be such that 2 + 2 = 4. The property
being such that 2 + 2 = 4 is part of being a world. So if there’s a world, it’s such
that 2 + 2 = 4. For if anything has the whole property, it must also have that
property’s parts. This holds more generally. Those things that are part of being
a world are necessary—you can’t have a world without them. Something has the
property being a world only if it’s such that what has to be the case in order for
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a world to exist is actually the case. Thus, being such that these things are the
case is part of being a world. So if anything has the property being a world, it has
every one of that property’s parts: being such that 2 is even, being such that 3 is
odd, and so on. The property being a world is a mereological sum of properties.
Not only does it have parts like being a totality of everything that exists, it also
has all those propositional properties that anything must have in order for a world
to exist at all.
Now to the formalism. I’ll only concern myself with the formalism underlying
an intensionalist approach to the modal propositional calculi. An intensionalist
approach to any logic requires that intensional inclusion relations among properties
determine the assignment of truth-values. Thus, an intensionalist approach to
the modal propositional calculi requires that there are properties associated with
propositions.
There is a function from propositions to the relevant properties. Start with the
usual stock of proposition letters p0, p1, p2, ... , which represent propositions not
further analyzed. Modal propositional logic contains non-atomic propositions, too.
Those non-atomic propositions require connectives. So let’s include the connec-
tives written ¬, ∧, ∨, and ⊃, which represent negation, conjunction, disjunction,
and the material conditional, respectively. Now let ‘[...]’ represent the function
which takes us from a proposition to the property of being such that the propo-
sition holds. So given some proposition φ, [φ] is the property, being such that φ.
Thus, for every such proposition φ, there is the property [φ], or being such that φ.
The function even takes negated propositions: given some negated proposition ¬φ,
we get [¬φ], the property being such that not-φ. Similar remarks apply, mutatis
mutandis, to all other non-atomic propositions. Thus, there is a 1-1 function from
propositions to properties via the function ‘[...]’.
A proposition φ is true according to the simplest form of modal intensionalism
just in case its corresponding property being such that φ is part of being the actual
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world.34 Remember, being the actual world is a property that “brings along”
everything that holds in our world, like George Washington’s existence. Where A
is the property being the actual world, modal intensionalism treats the truth of a
proposition with respect to to A:
(A) ‘φ’ is true =df. [φ] < A
Consequently, here’s how this treatment of truth “looks”:
a property that “brings along” everything that holds in our world, like
George Washington’s existence. Where A is the property being the ac-
tual world, modal intensionalism treats the truth of a proposition with
respect to to A:
(A) ‘φ’ is true =df. [φ] < A
Consequently, here’s how this treatment of truth “looks”:
A
[φ]
For any property [φ], being such that φ, if [φ] is a part of A, then [φ]’s
corresponding proposition φ is true. The propositions φ and ¬φ cannot
both be true because there are no true contradictions. That is, being the
actual world is presumably a consistent property and the properties [φ]
and [¬φ] preclude one another. Therefore, if [φ] is a part of A, [¬φ] is
not a part of A, and vice versa.
This suggests a range of principles that govern how these proposi-
tional properties relate to A. The following principles follow from our
intuitive understanding of ‘if...then’ statements, ‘...and...’ statements ,
etc. These principles secure the most basic inferences in propositional
logic: (i) that if [p ⊃ q] and [p] are parts of A, so is [q], (ii) that if [p
∧ q] is part of A, so are [p] and [q], (iii) that if [p] is part of A, so is [p
∨ q], and (iv) that if [p] is part of A, [¬¬p], being such that it isn’t the
case that it isn’t the case that p, is also part of A.
Where W is the property being a world, we can now characterize
necessity in modal intensionalist terms:
tions. In that sense, I do think that truth is “intensional.” Most think that truth is
extensional, and I basically agree. On my approach to propositional logic, one true
proposition may be substituted for any other true proposition salva veritate. My
treatment of predicate logic is a more complicated story, but there, too, I want to
claim that truth is extensional in the sense that most think it is.
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Fig. 3: Truth according to modal intensionalism
For any property [φ], being such that φ, if [φ] is a part of A, then [φ]’s cor-
responding proposition φ is true. The propositions φ and ¬φ cannot both be
true because there are no true contra ictio s. That is, being the actual world is
presumably a consistent pr perty and the properties [φ] and [¬φ] preclude one
another. Therefore, if [φ] is a part of A, [¬φ] is not a part of A, and vice versa.
This suggests a range of principl s that govern how these propositional proper-
ties relate to A. The following principles follow from our intuitive understanding
of ‘if...then’ statements, ‘...and...’ statements , etc. These principles secure the
most basic inferences in propositional logic: (i) that if [p ⊃ q] and [p] are parts of
A, so is [q], (ii) that if [p ∧ q] is part of A, so are [p] and [q], (iii) that if [p] is
34 So I do treat the truth of a sentence as depending on intensional inclusion relations. In that
sense, I do think that truth is “intensional.” Most think that truth is extensional, and I basically
agree. On my approach to propositional logic, one true proposition may be substituted for any
other true proposition salva veritate. My treatment of predicate logic is a more complicated
story, but there, too, I want to claim that truth is extensional in the sense that most think it is.
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part of A, so is [p ∨ q], and (iv) that if [p] is part of A, [¬¬p], being such that it
isn’t the case that it isn’t the case that p, is also part of A.
Where W is the property being a world, we can now characterize necessity in
modal intensionalist terms:
(N) ‘φ’ is true =df. [φ] < W
So if being such that φ is part of being a world, φ is necessary for any proposition
φ. Principle (N) “looks like” the picture below:
(N) ‘￿φ’ is true =df. [φ] < W
So if being such that φ is part of being a world, φ is necessary for any
proposition φ. Principle (N) “looks like” the picture below:
AW
[φ]
This picture suggests a number of other principles analogous to the prin-
ciples which secure the basic logical inferences in propositional logic: (i)
that if [p ⊃ q] and [p] are parts of W , so is [q], (ii) that if [p ∧ q] is
part of W , so are [p] and [q], (iii) that if [p] is part of W , so is [p ∨ q],
and (iv) that if [p] is part of W , [¬¬p], being such that it isn’t the case
that it isn’t the case that p, is also part of W . These principles validate
a number of intuitive modal inferences: (i) validates the inference from￿(p⊃ q) and ￿p to ￿q; (ii) validates the inference from ￿(p ∧ q) to ￿p;
(iii) validates the inference from ￿p to ￿(p ∨ q); and (iv) validates the
inference from ￿p to ￿¬¬p.
Modal extensionalism “looks” quite diﬀerent. According possible
worlds semantics, modal operators function implicitly like quantifiers
over a domain of possible worlds. On this approach, what’s necessary is
what’s true in every possible world. Here is what the necessity of some
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φ
Traditionally understood, the necessity and possibility operators are
interdefinable: ￿φ is equivalent to ¬♦¬φ, and ¬￿¬φ is equivalent to ♦φ.
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Fig. 4: Necessary trut according to modal intensionalism
This picture suggests a number of other principles analogous to the principles
which secure the basic logical inferences in propositional logic: (i) that if [p ⊃ q]
and [p] are parts of W , so is [q], (ii) that if [p ∧ q] is part of W , so are [p] and
[q], (iii) that if [p] is part of W , so is [p ∨ q], and (iv) that if [p] is part of W ,
[¬¬p], being such that it isn’t the case that it isn’t the case that p, is also part of
W . These principles validate a number of intuitive modal inferences: (i) validates
the inference from (p⊃ q) and p to q; (ii) validates the inference from (p
∧ q) to p; (iii) validates the inference from p to (p ∨ q); and (iv) validates
the inference from p to ¬¬p.
Modal extensionalism “looks” quite different. According possible worlds se-
mantics, modal operators functio implicitly like quantifiers over a domain of
possible worlds. On this approach, what’s necessary is what’s true in every possi-
ble world. Here is what the necessity of some proposition φ “looks like” according
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to the modal extensionalist:
(N) ‘￿φ’ is true =df. [φ] < W
So if being such that φ is part of being a world, φ is necessary for any
proposition φ. Principle (N) “looks like” the picture below:
AW
[φ]
This picture suggests a number of other principles analogous to the prin-
ciples which secure the basic logical inferences in propositional logic: (i)
that if [p ⊃ q] and [p] are parts of W , so is [q], (ii) that if [p ∧ q] is
part of W , so are [p] and [q], (iii) that if [p] is part of W , so is [p ∨ q],
and (iv) that if [p] is part of W , [¬¬p], being such that it isn’t the case
that it isn’t the case that p, is also part of W . These principles validate
a number of intuitive modal inferences: (i) validates the inference from￿(p⊃ q) and ￿p to ￿q; (ii) validates the inference from ￿(p ∧ q) to ￿p;
(iii) validates the inference from ￿p to ￿(p ∨ q); and (iv) validates the
inference from ￿p to ￿¬¬p.
Modal extensionalism “looks” quite diﬀerent. According possible
worlds semantics, modal operators function implicitly like quantifiers
over a domain of possible worlds. On this approach, what’s necessary is
what’s true in every possible world. Here is what the necessity of some
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φ
Traditionally understood, the necessity and possibility operators are
interdefinable: ￿φ is equivalent to ¬♦¬φ, and ¬￿¬φ is equivalent to ♦φ.
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Fig. 5: Necessary truth according to modal extensionalism
Traditionally understood, the necessity and possibility operators are interde-
finable: φ is equivalent to ¬♦¬φ, and ¬¬φ is equivalent to ♦φ. Therefore, I
characterize possibility in terms of this parthood relation also. If ‘φ’ is true if
and only if the corresponding property [φ] is part of W , then ‘♦φ’ is true if and
only if the property corresponding to the negation of φ, [¬φ], is not a part of W .
In other words, if [¬φ] is part of W , then the proposition ¬φ is necessarily true
and the proposition φ necessarily false. So φ is only possible if and only if [¬φ] is
not part of W . Thus:
(P) ‘♦φ’ is true =df. [¬φ] ≮ W
If ¬φ is necessarily true, i.e., if [¬φ] < W , then we shall say that W precludes φ
because φ is therefore not possible. Thus, the possible is that which W doesn’t
preclude.
Let’s pause to take stock. The modal intensionalist approach to modal propo-
sitional logic treats the truth of modal formulas (and propositions generally) as
depending on parthood relations between properties. There are two special prop-
erties, being a world and being the actual world, and the former is part of the latter.
A frame, according to the modal intensionalist, consists of the ordered triple 〈A,
W , P〉, where W is the property being a world, A is the property being the actual
world, and P is a binary relation on properties which defines the parthood relation
between them.
Thus far I’ve characterized necessity and possibility in terms of the propertyW .
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In the next section, I explain how different restrictions on the parthood relation
can secure various axioms of modal logic.
Restrictions on the Parthood Relation
Part of the elegance of possible worlds semantics is that the accessiblity relation
can be tweaked to validate certain modal formulas and invalidate others. Because
an alternative semantics must do the same, I shall briefly explain how possible
worlds semantics accomplishes these tasks and how the modal intensionalist does
the same.
In possible worlds semantics, p is necessarily true in a world w iff p is true
in every possible world accessible to w. And what worlds are accessible to others
depends on the set of ordered pairs of worlds, R. A world w′ is accessible from
another world w just in case 〈w, w′〉 is an ordered pair in R. If p is true in all
accessible worlds, p is necessarily true. And p is possibly true in w just in case p
is true in some possible world accessible from w. For example, if 〈w1, w2〉 is in R,
and p is true in w2, then p is possibly true in w1.
The weakest normal modal logic contains an axiom according to which  dis-
tributes over the conditional:
(K) (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃q)
According to possible worlds semantics, (K) holds for the following reason. If
‘(p ⊃ q)’ is true in every accessible possible world, then there is no accessible
possible world in which ‘p’ is true but ‘q’ is false. So if ‘p’ is true—i.e., if p is
true in every accessible possible world—then since there is no accessible possible
world in which ‘p’ is true but ‘q’ is false, q is also true in every accessible possible
world.
For the (K) axiom and all the others, there is a direct translation scheme from
the axioms to “statements” in the intensionalist system. Using (A), (N), and (P)
30
one may translate any axiom into the intensionalist system. And then one may
generalize the translation to secure some condition on P. By happy coincidence,
the resulting generalizations from the (M), (S4), (B), and (S5) axioms secure the
very parthood principles surveyed in Section 4. And (K) itself follows from one of
the principles that governs how propositional properties relate to properties such
as W and A.
Let’s consider (K) in more detail. Using the translation scheme, ‘(p ⊃ q)’ is
true just in case the property being such that if p, then q, or [p ⊃ q], is part of
W . If that’s true, then it’s just part of being a world that if p holds, q holds, too.
But suppose that being such that p, or [p] is part of being a world. Then q is also
part ofW , given the principles from Section 4 that govern how these propositional
properties relate to W .
In possible worlds semantics, the accessibility relation may have various fea-
tures depending on which ordered pairs are members of R. Doing without the more
cumbersome ordered pairs, we shall say that a world w′ is accessible to a world w
just in case wRw′. If every world is accessible to itself, the accessibility relation is
reflexive. In the T system of modal propositional logic, R is reflexive, i.e., for all
worlds w, wRw. In the T-system, the following formula is an axiom, and it secures
the reflexivity of the accessibility relation:
(M) p ⊃ p
Let’s assume that the accessibility relation is reflexive. Then, if p is true in every
world accessible to w and w is accessible to w, p is also true in w. Conversely, if p
is true in w and w is accessible to itself, then p is also possibly true in w. Possible
worlds semantics provides an elegant and convenient way to secure (M).
As the diagrams so far should should make clear, the modal intensionalist has
an equally elegant and convenient way to validate the M Axiom. According to
modal intensionalism, the propertyW is part of the property A. Hence, given the
transitivity of parthood, if a property is part of W , then it is a part of A, too.
31
Since a proposition is necessarily true if and only if its corresponding property is
a part ofW , it therefore must also be true because its corresponding property is a
part of A. Those who desire to validate the M Axiom should therefore adopt the
transitivity condition for the parthood relation P:
(A2*) x < y ∧ y < z ⊃ x < z35
The transitivity of parthood is widely adopted. Intuitively, the principle also holds
for logical parthood, as I argued in Section 4.
Onward. According to possible worlds semantics, the accessibility relation is
transitive just in case the following relation holds between worlds: for all worlds,
if wRw′ and w′Rw′′, then wRw′′. The following is an axiom of S4, a system which
requires transitivity of R:
(S4) p ⊃ p
Thus, having a transitive accessibility relation between worlds validates both the
inference that what is necessary is necessarily necessary and the inference that
what is possibly possible is possible.
On the intensionalist approach, the ininclusivity principle,
(P5) x < y ⊃ [x < y] < y,
validates the (S4) axiom. The ininclusivity condition ensures that if the property
[φ] is in W , then another property is in W , namely [[φ] < W ]. We’ve already
stipulated that necessity amounts to being a part of W . If the property [φ] is
a part of W , then the corresponding proposition φ is necessarily true; so if [φ]’s
being a part of W is itself a part of W , then φ is necessarily necessarily true.
In possible worlds semantics, the accessibility relation may be symmetric as
well. The accessibility relation is symmetric just in case, for any worlds w and w′,
if wRw′ then w′Rw. R is symmetric in the system B and the following is an axiom
of that system:
35 (A2) was originally formulated in terms of proper parthood, not parthood as it is here.
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(B) p ⊃ ♦p
On the intensionalist approach, the fortified parts principle,
(P6) x < z ∧ y < z ⊃ [¬x ≮ y] < y,
validates the B axiom. To bring this out, let’s make a number of substitutions.
Substitute [φ] for x, W for y, and A for z so that: [φ] < A ∧ W < A ⊃ [[¬φ] ≮
W ] < W . The idea is that if [φ] is a part of the property being the actual world,
then not only is [¬φ] not a part of W , but it is a part of W that [¬φ] is not a
part of W . The fortified parts principle validates the B axiom as follows. If [φ]
is part of A (i.e., if [φ] ’s corresponding proposition p is true), then the property
[¬φ]’s not being a part of W is a part of W (i.e., then the proposition ¬p’s being
possibly true is necessary).
And, finally, in possible worlds semantics R is Euclidean if the following con-
dition holds: for all worlds, if wRw′ and wRw′′, then w′Rw′′. S5 is an example of
a system with a Euclidean accessibility relation. S5 is equivalent to S4 plus the
B axiom (so the accessibility relation isn’t merely Euclidean), and the following is
an axiom of S5:
(S5) ♦p ⊃ ♦p
While (B) ensures that what is actual is necessarily possible, S5 ensures the
stronger claim that what is possible is necessarily possible. All modal truths
are necessary in S5.
To validate S5, we require the inexclusivity condition for P (with negations
before the ‘x’ for ease of presentation):
(P7) ¬x ≮ y ⊃ [¬x ≮ y] < y
It should be clear by now how (P7) validates the S5 axiom. If the property [¬p]
isn’t a part of W , then [p]’s corresponding proposition p, by (P), is possibly true.
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And then it follows from (P7) that p’s being possibly true is necessary, by (N).
And that is just another statement of the S5 axiom.
My intensional interpretation of the modal propositional calculi replaces the
accessibility relation R between worlds with a parthood relation P between prop-
erties. For the most common restrictions on accessibility, there are analogous
restrictions on parthood. The transitivity of parthood is analogous to the reflexiv-
ity of the accessibility relation. The ininclusivity of parthood ensures the validity
of the S4 axiom just as the transitivity of the accessibility relation does. And,
finally, the fortified parts principle and inexclusivity of the parthood relation val-
idate the B and S5 axioms, respectively, just as if we were to require that the
accessibility relation were symmetric and Euclidean.
Semantics and the Systems
The modal intensionalism I have developed thus far replaces Kripke’s triple,
〈G, K, R〉, with another, 〈A, W , P〉. In this ordered triple, A is the property,
being the actual world, W is the property being a world, and P is a set of ordered
pairs which defines the parthood relation. We’ve seen how the various constraints
on the parthood relation can validate the axioms of some popular modal systems.
Below, I shall suggest how we might use the sort of intensional semantics I sketched
above for the S5 system and weaker systems.
The S5 System
Building a semantics for S5 from the intensional approach above proves to be
the easiest. For S5, the parthood relation adopts all the mereological principles
we surveyed in Section 4. Theorists often comment on the intuitive appeal of the
S5 system, and the intensional approach explains this appeal. The S5 system is
intuitively appealing because the most intuitive property mereology secures it. For




It’s more difficult to build a semantics for the S4 system, however. In the
S4 system, which is often used to model provability and the physical modalities,
a proposition can be both possibly necessary but not necessary: ♦φ but ¬φ.
Moreover, in S4 a proposition can be true even though it isn’t necessarily possible
that it is true: φ but ¬♦φ. The intensionalist approach permits models for both.
To secure these results, we must avoid the mereological principle that validates
the B axiom. Therefore, the parthood relation for S4 must be transitive and
ininclusive, but not necessarily fortified. First, let’s build a model according to
which some proposition is true even though it isn’t necessarily possible that it
is true. On an intensional approach, then, we must secure two claims, (i) some
property [φ] is a part of A but (ii) [¬φ] is not a part of W is not a part of W . In
the formal apparatus: [φ] < A and [[¬φ] ≮ W ] ≮ W . So we just need to make
sure that for some property [φ], while the ordered pair 〈[φ], A〉 is in P, 〈[[¬φ] ≮
W ], W〉 is not.
We can also build a model according to which a proposition is possibly neces-
sary but not necessary. To make ‘♦φ’ true, we make sure that the following holds
of φ’s corresponding property: (i) [[φ] ≮ W ] ≮ W and (ii) [φ] ≮ W . Condition
(i) tells us that [φ]’s corresponding proposition φ is not necessarily not necessar-
ily true. And by (P), that tells us that ♦φ is true. And condition (ii) tells us
that [φ]’s corresponding proposition φ is not necessarily true. So the intensional
semantics sketched above can accommodate the S4 system without the B axiom.
The B System
How would the semantics look for the B system? The system B consists of the
system K plus the M and B axioms. So in such a system, the S4 axiom is not
valid. To construct such a semantics, we need only require a transitive and fortified
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parthood relation that isn’t ininclusive (or inexclusive). So in the B system ‘φ’
and ‘¬φ’ can both be true on a model. If both are true, then φ’s corresponding
property [φ] is a part of W , but [φ]’s being a part of W is not part of W : [φ] <
W and [[φ] < W ] ≮ W . So on a model like this, we make sure that the ordered
pair 〈[φ], W〉 is in the set P and that 〈[[φ] <W ], W〉 is not.
The T System
For the T system, the parthood relation is transitive, but not necessarily con-
sistent, ininclusive, or inexlusive. So we should be able to construct a model on
which the B axiom is not valid. On such a model, both ‘φ’ and ‘¬♦φ’ are true.
In such a case, φ’s corresponding property is a part of A. And, furthermore, that
[¬φ] is not a part of W is not a part of W . On a model like this, we ensure that
〈[φ], A〉 is in set P even though 〈[[¬φ] ≮W ], W〉 isn’t.
The K System
The K system is trickier. In the K system, the M axiom isn’t valid. So there
is a model for the system according to which φ is necessarily true but not true.
On such a model, the “parthood” relation P is not transitive, which is a departure
from what we ordinarily think about parthood. But there are notions related to
parthood according to which transitvity fails. In the literature on the transitivity
of parthood, several authors have attempted to provide instances where transitivity
seems to fail. For example, Nicholas Rescher writes:
In military usage, for example, persons can be parts of small units,
and small units parts of larger ones; but persons are never parts of
large units. Other examples are given by the various hierachical uses
of ‘part’. A part (i.e., biological subunit) of a cell is not said to be a
part of the organ on which that cell is a part. (1955: 10)
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This example and others are not genuine counterexamples to the transitivity of
parthood, however. What they show is that we have some notion of a φ-part,
where a part must meet some other condition besides just being a part. A modal
intensionalist can appeal to any one of these φ-parthood relations to explicate
the semantics that underlies the K System. Whatever that φ-parthood relation
is depends on what kind of discourse the K system is meant to model. In any
case, the intensional approach has the formal wherewithal to build such models.
To build a model on which the M axiom is invalid, make sure the following three
ordered-pairs are in set P: 〈[φ], W〉, 〈W , A〉, and 〈[¬φ], A〉. I should note that
on these models “A” and “W” may signify properties other than being the actual
world and being a world.
Modal intensionalism seems to have enough expressive power to model the
most common systems in modal propositional logic.
No Modal Primitives
A reductive analysis of modality would define modal notions in terms of non-
modal notions. There are a variety of reasons to seek a reductive analysis of modal
notions into non-modal ones.36 The general feeling seems to be that modal notions
are mysterious. According to Theodore Sider,
In metaphysics one seeks an account of the world in intelligible terms,
and there is something elusive about modal notions. Whether some-
thing is a certain way seems unproblematic, but that things might be
otherwise, or must be as they are, seems to call out for explanation.
Sider (2003, 184)
One common feeling is that a successful reduction would “take all of the mystery
out of modal discourse.”37 I’m skeptical that a reduction of modal to non-modal
36 See Sider (2003, 184-185) for a handful of such reasons.
37 Loux (1979, 155).
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terms would take the mystery out of modal discourse, however.
Lewis’s modal realism appears to be the single potentially reductive analysis
of modality. According to Lewis, what’s necessary is what’s true in (or at) all
possible worlds. And a possible world is a spatio-temporally isolated universe. So
φ is necessarily true just in case φ is true in (or at) every island universe. The right-
hand side of the biconditional presumably contains no modal notions. Therefore,
if Lewis’s account is correct, it provides a reductive analysis of necessity along
with the other modal notions. But even on Lewis’s account, there is something
mysterious about how modal discourse is supposed to latch onto the vast expanse
of island universes.
Other modal extensionalists have settled for primitive modal notions.38 Take,
for example, Plantinga’s extensionalist approach to modality according to which
possible worlds are maximal possible states of affairs. According to Plantinga, a
state of affairs S is maximal if and only if for every state of affairs T either S can’t
obtain without T or S can’t obtain with T. Plantinga uses modal notions to define
what maximal states of affairs are. Since maximal states of affairs are possible
worlds, he cannot use possible worlds to explicate the modal notions involved in
the definition of maximal states of affairs. Whether a state of affairs is possible or
not is primitive.
On my view, a proposition φ is necessary just in case the property being such
that φ is part of the property being a world. Parthood is non-modal, and I haven’t
defined propositional properties or the property being a world in modal terms.
And since I define possibility in terms of necessity, it appears that my analysis of
the modal notions is reductive.
One may object that I use modal terms to characterize the parthood relation
between properties. For example, I say things like “There can be no dog unless
there is an animal, so we may judge that being an animal is part of being a dog.”
If I use modal notions to explicate the parthood relation between properties, then
38 Plantinga (1974); Adams (1974); Stalnaker (1976).
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my analysis isn’t reductive after all.
In response, I claim that I say such things to help the reader think in terms she
may not realize she ordinarily thinks in. I think we judge that dogs are necessarily
animals because we judge that being an animal is part of being a dog, not the other
way around. Furthermore, dogs are necesarily animals because being an animal is
part of being a dog. Now one may ask whether being a dog might fail to have being
an animal as one of its parts. The objection here is that if I take a property’s
parts to be essential to it, then I have an unanalyzed modal primitive after all.
But I have no unanalyzed primitives. I admit that I think it’s necessary that being
a dog has being an animal as a part. But I analyze that claim in the following
way: it’s necessary that being an animal is part of being a dog just in case being
such that being an animal is part of being a dog is itself part of being a dog. The
resulting analysis contains no modal terms. As a result, I see no reason to think
that my particular intensionalist approach needs primitive modal notions.
But for all that, some mystery remains. On my view, properties have a great
number of parts. For example, being 458 has being equal to 117 + 314 as a part.
Indeed, being 458 has a part that corresponds to everything one can truly say
about the number 458. And this is really no less mysterious than a primitive modal
notion. But perhaps I have acheived something by consolidating two mysterious
realms into one.
Conclusion
Modal intensionalism is a genuine alternative to the widely accepted exten-
sionalist approach to modality. The intensionalist approach promises an actualist,
ontologically sensible account of modality. This general approach promises to
ground modal facts in our world’s intrinsic character by appealing to a property
most of us already believe in anyway. Whether modal intensionalism makes good
on these promises depends on two very important questions. The first is whether
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the intensionalist approach can be extended to quantified modal logic. The second
question concerns the nature of these properties. Are they course-grained concepts
of some kind or a species of universals or something else entirely?
As for the first question, I do believe that the approach can be developed into
a semantics for quantified modal logic. But, of course, the proof is in the pudding,
and this paper has enough pudding already. As for the second question, the modal
intensionalist approach may be developed in any number of ways. There are prob-
ably as many possible intensionalist accounts as there are actual extensionalist
accounts. I favor an account of modal intensionalism that identifies these proper-
ties with universals of a certain sort. But my treatment of universals must also
wait. Consequently, whether and to what extent modal intensionalism succeeds
remains to be seen. But with the entire approach in place, I hope to provide al-
ternative accounts of counterfactuals, essences, and proper names, not to mention
new approaches to deontic, epistemic, and tense logics.
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